Abstract-We study decentralized markets which include middlemen, producers and consumers connected via a trading network. We develop a model for trade in such settings based on non-cooperative bargaining with search frictions. Our goal is to investigate how the structure of the trading network and the role of middlemen influence the market's efficiency and fairness. To this end, we introduce the concept of limit stationary equilibrium which characterizes the trading patterns that emerge in a general trading network with a large population of agents. We use this concept to analyze how competition among middlemen is influenced by the network structure, how endogenous delay emerges in trade and how surplus is shared between producers and consumers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In most markets trade does not involve just producers and consumers but also one or more middlemen serving as intermediaries. For example, brokers and market makers fill this role in financial markets as do wholesalers and retailers in many manufacturing industries.
Classical economic approaches to studying markets, such as competitive equilibrium analysis, largely abstract away the role of such middlemen. There are two main lines of studies the role and impact of middlemen on the economy. The first focuses on search friction. For example, in [1] agents meet pairwise and bargain over time and must wait until they meet a suitable partner to trade. The time it takes to find a partner is costly. Subsequently there has been much work [2] - [4] in studying different models of trade (e.g., various noncooperative bargaining models) and using these to analyze how middlemen influence the formation of prices and the efficiency of trade. Much of the aforementioned work has focused on models in which all producers and consumers have access to the same middlemen. However, often this is not the case due, for example, to various institutional or physical barriers. Recently, another line of work (e.g. [5] and [6] ) on middlemen aims to capture more complex networks among sellers buyers and middlemen. However, these studies do not account for trade frictions.
This paper provides a starting point to bridge this gap: as in [5] we consider a trading network connecting consumers to producers, but as in [1] , agents randomly meet over time and engage in non-cooperative bargaining protocols. Thus, our paper provides a general framework that incorporates three important features of markets. First is the underlying network structure: not all pairs of agents can interact in the market. The second is the non-cooperative bargaining setting: no agents have the power to set prices, the prices are formed through a negotiation process. Finally, the third is the search cost: agents discount their payoff if they do not find a proper trading partner or fail to negotiate. The possibility of not finding a proper trading partner is an important additional search cost in our model.
It is well known that such complex models are often intractable. However, by considering large markets and adopting a mean-field approach [7] - [10] , we show [11] that this type of model becomes tractable and exhibits many interesting properties. In particular, following [12] , we consider a non-cooperative bargaining game in a finite network, and study the agents' behavior in the limit as the population at each node of the network increases [11] . We introduce a notion of a limit stationary equilibrium, and show that it always exists. We then use this concept to investigate the efficiency of the market, how bargaining with middlemen cause endogenous delay in equilibrium, and how network structure influences competition among middlemen and the share of surplus between producers and consumers.
